condition, recognizing it as subject to the vicissitudes of our real and concrete situation. He thus considers experience not merely in terms of the Understanding but also in terms of our sensibility and desire-in other words, not merely in terms of its conditions of intelligibility, but also (as he puts it, in his beautiful and illuminating discussion of Chantal Akerman's film Jeanne Dielman, 23, quai du commerce, 1080 Bruxelles [1975] ), in terms of "the conditions of its completion and disruption." In 8 this way he not only extends the Kantian answer to skepticism but also derives a new task for philosophy from Kant's own characterization of aesthetic judgment in the third critique, according to which the condition for claiming that something is beautiful, for example, is the demand for agreement on the part of others, even despite the possibility of rejection or rebuke. He thus establishes a general strategy for the treatment of philosophical problems that is grounded in an acknowledgement of the fragility of our concrete circumstances and in the clear awareness of the fate of our words as subject to the limitations of our own constitution-as much to our resistance to the demands of concrete experience as to our dependence on the receptiveness of beings similar to us, suffering the same constraints and limitations, the same difficulties of feeling, as we do.
Cavell is practicing a new way of thinking, one that renounces the need for possession that has characterized it in modern philosophy and assumes it rather as a loving receptiveness. As he puts it, following Heidegger, it is thinking as thanking or as praise. Philosophy therefore abandons the search for scientific knowledge and its attitude of control in favor of the cultivation of awareness in a conduct of gratitude, in which the task, far from the attempt to penetrate or tear from the object its essence, consists rather in "a specification or test of tribute," where I have to stake my 9 -self on the basis of nothing more, but also nothing less, than my own capacity to make myself intelligible to others. This defines a different agenda for philosophical criticism, where the dangers it faces are those of self-deception, the resistance to one's own desire, the fear of one's own mind-in other words, all those risks which Cavell has characterized as "the trials of praise." 10 Skepticism may be seen then, in this new perspective, as a denial of our finitude, as the expression of a need, as old as Plato himself, to overcome our limitations and establish our citizenship in another world. But what modern skepticism specifically discovers, according to Cavell, is that our own words can deceive us, that the enemy, so to speak, resides in our own hearts. For this reason he proposes to undermine the problem, explicitly assuming the responsibility which it is meant to evade:
This threat of skepticism is something you can repress or disguise with false cheerfulness and mock intellectuality. I want to turn that threat around so that one sees it is still possible to become responsible for one's language without having to claim more justification than one's own grounding in oneself, in one's own life [...] I am able to take responsibility for every word that comes out of my mouth, as a way of accepting that there is no responsibility for the world but my own. And this is something that everyone has to say; and it's something I want philosophy to teach each person to say in the midst of the temptation to skepticism. 11 Appealing, with Wittgenstein and Austin, to ordinary language, Cavell establishes the task to treat our words, not as mere vehicles of information or objects of intellectual knowledge, but as part of a concrete and vital activity, as expressions of will and desire, to which we need to learn to listen in our concrete actions-or to see them as actions themselves, inserted in the world-approaching them affectively, and thus with a greater personal commitment than that of a merely intellectual interest. For Cavell it is essential that philosophy begin with our subjectivity, as if its starting point should always be in one's own concrete experience, and especially attentive of one's own interest. The issue of desire, in other words, is central to his conception of philosophy.
An extraordinary demonstration of the type of criticism he practices-as well as of the singular suitability of film as a medium for it-is offered by his moving reading of two routines of Fred Astaire's, which realizes in a concrete way the aspiration the occasion for cursing the world precisely for its not providing your cause of praise, hence being left with the doubt that its behavior is caused by your having cursed it with a tainted love. 15 The logic he outlines thus suggests that in our conception of the philosophical problem, and in our subsequent urge to solve it, we may be enacting an unconscious evasion of this dynamic, witnessing a constitutional resistance to the expressive or affective dimension or experience. If Freud's essay "Mourning and Melancholy" may be said to instruct us in "the difference between the pain of losing what has meant the world to us and the pain of returning to the world that must contain loss," we could say that the texts that fol 16 -low are themselves a meditation on that lesson as it pertains to the fate of philosophy-not the academic discipline, however, but the human calling that goes by that name. It is as if with Descartes' landmark expression of modern skepticism, the philosophical denial of the world became an emblem of the human resistance to the transitory, an instance of the pathological side of mourning.
But Cavell refuses to see the situation merely as a neurosis. He is proposing rather the cultivation of an oblique way of seeing which, as he tells us, provides "a picture of getting to know that makes it indirect, negates the direction in which philosophy takes knowledge to come." This does not mean, however, that philosophy 17 ought to renounce its capacity to penetrate or see behind appearances to grasp the essence of things. The objects in the world are inexhaustible in their interest and their capacity to awaken us to the extraordinary, so we simply need to transform that power of penetration into "the ability to be patient, to suffer, to penetrate by allowing oneself to think another way, to be differently, more strongly, more finely, struck." 18 As he goes on to explain:
It is a readiness to stop when you have nothing more to say; a willingness to subject yourself to silence, to mortality, to finitude, to end, to your own limita- It is not surprising that Cavell's proposal is aversive to a philosophy that identifies itself with the ideals of scientific rigor and clarity, a philosophy that is always intent on denying our limitation, evading the reality of death, hence unwilling to be surprised, holding on to its poor certainties and denying itself the discovery of what is important in the trivial or the ordinary. Cavell seeks a conversion of philosophy, which involves an attitude of receptiveness and the acknowledgement of a hidden activity beyond our consciousness and will, behind the silence of our words, of our objects, and even of our own mind.
This demand for listening and observation permeates Cavell's thought and informs his style of writing, where the reader must listen between the silences, hear voices behind the voices of the text, and enter into the secret dialogue between his words. As he notes, "we are, every instant and beyond all measures we recognize, affecting others (and ourselves) with our speech, hence with our silence; drawing blood as far as words reach, namely, in a word, everywhere." 20 In company with Freud and Wittgenstein, he dedicates himself to the task of asking how and why our words sometimes get the best of us, or betray us, as if looking for their underside, insisting that we need to find out what they deny, not in order to determine the limits of our responsibility but to cultivate a lucid awareness of our real condition and learn to live with our own limitations. Ultimately it is a matter of recovering for philosophy that tragic consciousness which it has lost in its epistemological obsession, in its disowning the reality of desire.
! . Cavell, "Interview," 15. 20
